The debate about online freedom is back in the spotlight after Pavel Durov, founder and CEO of Telegram, issued a particularly harsh message on the occasion of his 41st birthday. On his public profiles and on his own channel, the entrepreneur warns that The open Internet could be entering its final stretch, dragged down by new rules and controls that, in his opinion, dilute fundamental rights.
Durov's warning is not limited to a generic complaint. The executive focuses on current government decisions that, under the umbrella of security and regulation, could turn the internet into a surveillance mechanism. He places his focus on digital identification in the United Kingdom, the age verification systems implemented in Australia, and the European proposal for mass scanning of private messages. All of this, he warns, paints a picture that he describes as "dystopian" and that His generation would perhaps be the last to escape.
Who is Pavel Durov and what exactly did he say?
Pavel Durov, a key figure in the digital ecosystem driven by Telegram, has been advocating for years that private communication should be inviolable. In his most recent message, he argues that "what promised to be a free exchange of information" is mutating into "the ultimate tool of control." Without repeating his exact words, the central idea is unequivocal: Privacy safeguards are being dismantled piece by piece through laws that open the door to inspections and identity links.
The statement didn't stay on his channel: it was also shared on X (formerly Twitter), and for hours, the Telegram app displayed a prominent banner linking to the text. This display, unusual for its visibility, underscores the seriousness Durov attributes to the current moment. For him, It is not a theoretical warning, but a call to react before it's too late.
The measures that set off the alarms, one by one
Pavel Durov's diagnosis is based on concrete examples. According to his analysis, there are three aspects that characterize the regulatory drift: Mandatory identity, age verification, and communication scanningTheir criticism is that, combined, they erode anonymity, break encryption, and normalize pre-message scrutiny.
- Digital ID in the UK: a plan to associate activities and procedures with a state-verifiable identity.
- Age verification in Australia: access control to social networks for minors under 16 years of age, with digital verification systems.
- ChatControl in the EU: proposal to allow mass scanning of private messages and images under the guise of protecting minors.
For Durov, the problem isn't just technical. It's political and cultural. Normalizing these practices, he insists, leads to "the exceptional becoming routine." And when that happens, Privacy ceases to be the rule and becomes a concession.
ChatControl in the EU: Political and Technical Challenge
Within the European Union, the proposal known as ChatControl has raised red flags among activists, cryptographers, and platforms. Critics argue that requiring messages to be inspected before being encrypted undermines the basic pillar of secure messaging. In recent days, opposition from the main political force in Germany has complicated its approval; with 97 seats, its weight is significant and has forced rethink the calendar and the discussion forum, moving the battle to the European Council.
Signal's president, Meredith Whittaker, has summarized the consensus among security experts: there is no "back door" that only the good guys can use. Any exception to encryption creates loopholes that can be exploited by malicious third parties. Her position is blunt: "If you force content scanning, you invalidate the end-to-end encryption." That, de facto, opens a systemic attack vector affecting millions of users.
The debate isn't new, but it has intensified. Vitalik Buterin, co-founder of Ethereum, has also questioned the direction of ChatControl and its impact on private communications. For technical experts of his stature, the message is clear: The mathematics of encryption does not negotiate with shortcuts. Either everyone is protected, or everyone is weakened.
Digital identity in the United Kingdom: promises and shadows
The UK government has promoted a digital ID scheme that would validate the right to live and work, in addition to facilitating public procedures such as licensing or access to services. On paper, the goal is to streamline procedures and curb the underground economy. But questions quickly arise: who safeguards this data? What are the limits on its access? For civil society groups and some citizens, this is where the risk lies. Not in the identification itself, but in its subsequent use and the possibility of chain records that profile the life of each person.
The rejection has resulted in a massive petition with over 2,8 million signatures, far exceeding the usual thresholds for forcing debate in Parliament. This figure shows that the issue transcends technicalities and inhabits the terrain of constitutional rights and guarantees.
Australia and age verification: protecting minors without invading privacy
Australia has opted to restrict access to social media for children under 16 starting December 10, and among the tools on the table is a digital age verification system. The underlying intention is understandable: shield minors from harmful contentHowever, critics of the measure warn of a side effect: if sensitive databases are built to verify ages, it creates incentives for their reuse and, with it, a greater risk of leaks or abuse.
The balance, therefore, is delicate. The key question is how to validate age without forcing full identification and without storing excessive data. This "middle ground" is what digital rights organizations are demanding, as they fear that the system's engineering will end up degrading anonymity in practice.
State pressure accusations: Germany, the United Kingdom, and France under Pavel Durov's spotlight
In his statement, Durov accuses some European countries of tightening the reins against critical voices. He cites Germany for prosecuting those who question authorities, the United Kingdom for imprisoning people for social media posts, and France for criminally investigating tech leaders who defend privacy. These are statements we frame as his position; in any case, the message is clear: The scope for dissent on the Internet is reportedly shrinking..
Beyond whether each case fits into specific criminal categories, the warning points to context: when the legal environment is diffuse and the threshold for "punishable content" widens, it produces a chilling effect. People self-censor. And that spiral, Pavel Durov concludes, impoverishes public debate and degrades democratic life.
Privacy, encryption, and the role of cryptocurrencies
Privacy isn't a whim, the crypto ecosystem reminds us. Bitcoin was born with a pseudonymous design: addresses instead of names, direct peer-to-peer transfers, and the elimination of intermediaries like banks in the transaction flow. In that paradigm, Identity protection is part of the design, not a later addition; that is why many voices recommend solutions of password managementHence, many in the industry are concerned about regulations that could indirectly force access to data or break encryption.
In Europe, even technologies aimed at preserving confidentiality—such as Mimblewimble-type protocols or zero-knowledge proofs—have come under more stringent scrutiny. The reason is understandable: Authorities seek tools to combat crimeTension arises when proposed solutions extend surveillance to the entire population, not just suspects, diluting the principle of proportionality.
Telegram in the spotlight: piracy, controversy, and the incident in France
Telegram has frequently been singled out for the role of some of its channels in the illicit distribution of content, from sports broadcasts to series and films. This use—which violates copyright—has generated friction with rights holders and regulators. Furthermore, in August 2024, Pavel Durov himself was arrested by French authorities as part of an investigation into illicit activities on the platform; later, the extent of Telegram's collaboration with law enforcement became clear. The episode, however, forced internal changes and unpopular decisions for part of their community.
For its critics, the platform has been slow to address abusive behavior. For its defenders, however, Telegram has maintained a privacy-oriented approach without giving in to mainstream pressure. Between the two views lies a fundamental question: is it possible? prosecute specific crimes without dismantling confidentiality that protects the legitimate user?
"They sold us a lie": the core of the argument
Pavel Durov argues that a narrative has taken hold according to which the great achievement of our time would be to get rid of tradition, privacy, sovereignty, the free market, and freedom of expression. In his view, this idea is a trap. Renouncing these principles doesn't make us more modern; it makes us more more vulnerable and dependentAnd when those pillars fall, he warns, the deterioration becomes moral, intellectual, and economic.
The language is deliberately dramatic because it seeks a reaction. It's unusual for the founder of a major platform to openly declare that he "has nothing to celebrate" on his birthday. This theatricality serves a purpose: stir up your audience so that he understands that the window of opportunity is closing.
The technical response: why back doors don't work
Security engineers and cryptographers have been explaining for decades that there are no secure exceptions to end-to-end encryption. A backdoor isn't a controlled privilege: it's a hole in the hull. At first, it may seem like it's only good for offshore rescues, but at second, pirates will also use it. That's the heart of Signal's argument and that of much of the cybersecurity technical community, and they remember that there are privacy tools like apps to hide files.
The paradox is that a "limited" weakening of encryption can end up causing more damage than it prevents. Documents, conversations, and proof of life of millions of people—journalists, activists, public officials, ordinary citizens—depend on communications that cannot be inspected in transit. If a breach is opened, the risk multiplies in a systemic way.
What the defenders of these laws say
Those who promote stricter regulations appeal to the protection of minors, the fight against abuse, and the need to provide authorities with modern tools. No one disputes these objectives. The clash arises when defining the means to achieve themIf the solution involves monitoring everyone to persecute a few, the balance between security and freedom is broken.
Part of the discussion will be resolved on technical grounds—how to prove age without revealing identity, for example—and another part is irremediably political: what is the acceptable threshold for state interference? In this regard, the position of countries with weight in the EU, such as Germany, could tip the balance, as has already been seen with the halting of ChatControl and its transfer to negotiations in the Council. This parliamentary dynamic will show how far the consensus goes to play the cipher.
The echo in the crypto ecosystem and decentralization as an antidote
For Durov, decentralization is more than just a buzzword. It's the mechanism that limits the power of centralized control, both for companies and governments. This principle resonates with the philosophy of blockchain and with projects like TON, which aim to spread trust across the network. From this perspective, Protecting privacy is preserving the last frontier of personal freedom in the digital age.
The crypto sector, for its part, sees these discussions as a defining battle. It's not just a question of assets, but of censorship-resistant communication and payment infrastructures. If encryption degrades, the promise of secure peer-to-peer transactions and private messaging loses its strength. Therefore, every attempt to "read" encrypted content generates a coordinated response from technologists and civil organizations.
The United States in the Mirror: The Bias of Public Discussion
In his letter, Pavel Durov focused on Europe, the United Kingdom, and Australia, but similar debates are taking place elsewhere. In the United States, several states have proposed restrictions and controls on minors in app stores and social media. Some critics point out that this selective bias in singling out countries also influences perceptions of the problem. Nevertheless, the core of the argument remains: The global trend is towards more control, did not do less.
These comparisons serve as a reminder that no territory is immune to regulatory shortcuts. What is a pilot in one country today may be standard tomorrow in another. That's why privacy advocates insist on establishing technical red lines: end-to-end encryption and the universal non-linking of identities. should not be negotiated.
What is being decided now and why does it matter?
The European situation is particularly relevant: a decision on ChatControl would set a global precedent. If "preventive" message scanning becomes standard, other jurisdictions could replicate it. If, on the other hand, encryption is recognized as a public good that cannot be broken, privacy will be enhanced. Hence, the positioning of large member countries is closely watched.
In the UK, the final scope of the digital identity scheme—what data is requested, how it is stored, with whom it is shared—will determine whether the tool is a facilitator of procedures or a passport to surveillance. In Australia, the specific design of the age verification system will make the difference between protect minors without invading adults or push the entire population to show more than necessary to access the Internet.
"If we remain asleep, a dark world is upon us," Pavel Durov warned in his message. Beyond the drama, his driving point is that negligence has its costs: what today is freedom by default may become a fragile exception tomorrow.
The struggle won't end with a single vote or a viral thread. It's a process. And every decision—from a court, a parliament, a platform—constitutes or subtracts in practice. That's why technical and civil voices insist on participating in public consultations, hearings, and debates. The goal isn't to deny the need to combat crime, but rather achieve provided tools that do not condemn the majority to permanent preventive surveillance.
What's at stake is not just how we communicate, but how we think and create when we think someone is looking over our shoulder. For product designers, the invitation is clear: privacy by design, data minimization, and strong encryption, in addition to adequate . For legislators, the challenge is to fine-tune the laws without breaking the technical foundations that make a safe internet possible for everyone. At that point, public pressure is often decisive.
Pavel Durov's warnings, the German brake on ChatControl, the reservations of Signal and crypto leaders, the identity plans in the United Kingdom and age verification in Australia, in addition to Telegram's controversial history and its defense of encryption, paint a picture that is not simple, but clear: either the real risks are addressed with surgical and privacy-respecting solutions, or we will end up normalizing disproportionate controls that empty the original promise of the network of meaning. And there, time is running out of those who want to maintain a truly free Internet. Share this information so that other users know about the topic.